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The question of whether the European Union (EU) is becom-
ing a credible security actor capable of protecting itself 
and contributing to global stability is important now more 
than ever.  In the 21st century, Europe faces a broad range 
of security threats in the form of terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, and cross-
border trafficking of humans, drugs, and weapons. Failed 
and weak states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are often 
the source of these security threats. And more recently, Rus-
sia’s aggression towards its neighbors has become of press-
ing, immediate concern.
Over the past twenty years, the EU has actually made 
remarkable advances in combatting these threats through 
the achievement of security integration – that is, the transfer 
of policy authority from the national to the supranational 
level – both in its external and internal dimensions. There 
has been even greater progress with internal security inte-
gration – dealing with border control, visas, privacy and 
data protection, cross-border investigations, prosecutions, 
and arrest warrants, among other things. But even in the 
external security realm, the number of civilian and military 
operations under the EU flag has mushroomed, and progress 
towards the pooling and sharing of defense resources has 
advanced significantly. Despite a few high-profile setbacks, 
EU member-states are gradually agreeing to dismantle cer-
tain barriers to security integration that previously stood 
at the very core of traditional state sovereignty. Why is this 
happening? And how can this ongoing process help the EU 
tackle its current security challenges? 
Any analysis that focuses exclusively on the preferences 
of member states misses the crucial role played by various 
types of diplomatic actors, mainly based in Brussels, who 
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have been largely responsible for much of the security inte-
gration in recent years. Ambassadors, military generals, sci-
entists, crisis management specialists, and others supersede 
national governments in achieving consensus in security 
decision-making. They comprise powerful knowledge-based 
networks of experts, or epistemic communities. They are at 
the heart of the process of security integration, making head-
way at a remarkable speed by virtue of their members’ shared 
expertise, common culture, professional norms, and meet-
ing frequency. These knowledge-based networks are able 
to effectively persuade member-states of their policy goals. 
Many of these actors are both connected to nation-states and 
operate beyond strict state control in carrying out their Euro-
pean functions. 
Two strong examples include the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(Coreper) both of which are housed within the Council of the 
EU, the EU’s main decision-making body. As these examples 
show, cohesive epistemic communities can be persuasive 
diplomatic actors, achieving security goals that would have 
otherwise been very difficult if left to the member states 
alone.
The EUMC & External Security
EU military representatives (milreps) have worked their way 
up through the ranks of their national armies or navies for an 
average of 35 years.  In this time, career experience, educa-
tion, and training give them a high level of technical knowl-
edge. Many of them have served as commanders and chiefs 
of staff, and have been posted as faculty at defense colleges, 
among other things. The strong similarities in training and 
education add to a culture of shared values and worldviews. 
They find that by the time they begin work in the EUMC, 
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arriving at consensus is unproblematic. Their training and 
career experiences give them a body of shared knowledge 
that is virtually taken for granted.  
The key source of their ability to agree so readily is their high 
level of tactical expertise. They have specialized knowledge 
of how best to devise the best military strategy on the ground, 
and during an operation. Over the past decade, this knowl-
edge has also come to include a range of other military activi-
ties in which states are occupied, such as crisis management, 
civil-military relations, and humanitarian intervention. 
Naturally, milreps may find that they have redlines from their 
capitals that they cannot cross. But if they are able to suc-
cessfully persuade their capitals to shift their political posi-
tions, agreement in the EUMC comes very quickly as a result 
of their shared professional expertise. 
Two Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) military 
operations – NAVOR Atalanta and EUFOR Chad – provide 
illustrative examples of how milreps are able to regularly 
achieve consensus even when member-states disagree from 
the start. In the case of NAVFOR Atalanta, not all member-
states supported the launching of such an operation at the 
outset. There were a number of issues at stake. First, it was to 
be the EU’s first naval operation, and there were many non-
EU ships in the region already, seeking to deal with the pirates 
in their own ways. Second, as the largest donor to Somalia, 
the EU wanted to ensure that World Food Program (WFP) 
ships were all safely escorted to ports. Third, 30% of EU oil 
is transported through this ocean region. Tackling the grow-
ing problem of piracy was clearly something that needed to 
be addressed, but some member states believed that the best 
course of action did not necessarily involve a formal CSDP 
operation. The milreps, however, saw the naval operation 
as politically attractive and with a high potential for success 
because of the EU’s unique experience at incorporating the 
civil dimension into military initiatives, bringing together 
other (non-EU) actors, and promoting international stability.
Discussions within the EUMC resulted in a compromise 
to launch a formal CSDP operation contingent upon the 
creation of a coordination network between ships, includ-
ing those from non-EU nations, such as China, Russia, and 
India, as well as between these ships and ground personnel. 
In addition, they called for advance agreements with nearby 
countries on procedures for dealing with captured pirates 
on the ground. In the end, the milreps essentially pushed 
for a wider mission, and by relying on military logic and 
expertise, they were able to persuade those in the capitals. In 
particular, their top priority was to ensure the safe passage 
of World Food Program ships, followed by providing protec-
tion for merchant ships as a second priority. Member states 
eventually agreed that a formal CSDP operation under EU 
command would be the best route to take given the nature 
of the threat and the shared goal of ensuring that humanitar-
ian aid reached Somalia. Once the political mandate was in 
place, the actual operation was launched in a matter of days 
on 10 November 2008. Since that date, not a single WFP ship 
has been lost to pirates, and member states agreed to renew 
the operation, which is still ongoing.
Similarly, in the case of EUFOR Chad – a humanitarian oper-
ation to bring security and relief to refugees and displaced 
people – member states initially disagreed about getting 
involved in an operation so far away that did not have any 
immediate political and economic interest for them. At the 
same time, they did feel increasing pressure to do some-
thing about the growing problem in Chad, and its 400,000 
displaced Darfur refugees. Because of their colonial ties 
to Chad, the French put forward the proposal to launch a 
military operation. Within the EUMC, milreps decided to set 
aside the debate about interests versus moral obligation, and 
focused instead on whether such an operation could achieve 
successful results.  
Given, the reluctance on the part of some member states 
to contribute troops, the answer to this question was not 
straightforward. Several attempts to generate promises of 
troop contributions had not resulted in the necessary level 
of participation, and there was an initial shortfall of 2,000 
troops (it was thought that 6,000 were needed). Several 
member-states saw this as further reason not to go forward 
with an operation. However, milreps determined that despite 
this shortage, there were enough reserve forces to satisfy the 
requirements, alongside an extra contribution from France. 
They stipulated that as long as the UN took over as planned 
one year later, and that the EU operation complemented the 
UN’s efforts to protect civilians, refugees, and humanitarian 
facilities the chances for success were high. They deter-
mined that EUFOR Chad should not address the core causes 
of the conflict – violence between different ethnic groups 
and armed militia – as this was not best resolved through 
military force. Despite great hesitance and division among 
member-states initially, the expertise and persuasiveness of 
the milreps served as a catalyst for the launching of a new 
operation on 15 March 2008 that would not have otherwise 
gone forward.
The role of the EUMC in developing military capabilities in 
the context of the EU over the long-term is another dimen-
sion of its power. The EUMC works closely with the European 
Defence Agency (EDA), in pursuing the goals of the Long-
Term Vision for European Defence and Capability Needs, 
which focuses on increasing capabilities and achieving inter-
operability.  The EUMC is thus a bridge between the member 
states and the EDA. Moreover, since their primary goal is 
to execute successful CSDP operations, and provide for the 
common security of EU citizens, they realize that working 
together will be necessary for the EU to have efficient and 
effective planning and procurement, particularly in light of 
declining populations and defense budgets.
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Coreper & Internal Security
Coreper is equally important to consider as an example of 
highly effective Brussels-based epistemic community. It is a 
committee comprised of an ambassador from each member 
state, but in practice its influence as a knowledge-based 
network is far stronger than its formal role would suggest. 
Among other things, it has had tremendous influence in 
developing the internal security side of EU integration.
Coreper’s members undergo a rigorous selection and train-
ing process as part of their professional development. 
Professional selection begins right out of university, and is 
repeated when diplomats are subsequently promoted to new 
positions over time. The fact that they come from the same 
top universities contributes to a similar social and network-
ing background. Training occurs at the foreign ministries, 
but it is clear that actual time in the field – performing the 
daily duties of a diplomat, navigating through a difficult mul-
tilateral negotiation, and learning the nitty-gritty of foreign 
policy – is a crucial component of this. Coreper ambassadors 
originate from this process, and after decades of service, have 
shown themselves to be the best at what they do. Among sen-
ior diplomatic postings, a Coreper appointment is considered 
one of the most prestigious and challenging.  
Coreper’s common culture holds the group together, and 
results in a similar worldview that enables them to more eas-
ily reach consensus and persuade their capitals of further 
integration. Coreper’s esprit de corps is manifested as a feel-
ing of being part of a club and empathizing with each other.  
What does this wealth of expertise and common culture lead 
to in terms of actual policy goals? First, members of Coreper 
to a great extent believe that integration is inevitable and 
good for Europe. One manifestation of this is that there are 
no fixed alliances among certain member-states. They genu-
inely deal with each issue on its own terms, based on their 
expertise and ability to get the capitals on board. They feel 
that they are serving European citizens in common, as one 
constituency, and that the Council is in effect a kind of EU 
government.
They naturally face resistance from the capitals where the 
tendency is to try to directly control the direction of internal 
security policy and to guard national regulations. Generally, 
the main way in which a capital has leverage over its ambas-
sadors is through formal instructions, and the main way in 
which ambassadors exercise agency is through flexibility with 
those instructions. While receiving instructions from capitals 
is a big part of how this network of diplomats operates and is 
constrained, in practice, instructions serve as a more formal-
ized means of coordination and persuasion between the two. 
Instructions are rarely set in stone for high-ranking ambas-
sadors. They serve as a basis for deliberation. Thus, ambas-
sadors are able to persuade their capitals of consensus that 
they reach in Brussels.  Sometimes there are certain red lines, 
but even then the obstacles are not insurmountable.
The example of the 2005 Strategy on Radicalization & 
Recruitment (SRR) provides a brief illustration of how Core-
per is able to infuse a particular policy with the shared, 
expert beliefs of the ambassadors. The SRR was designed to 
define the terrorist threat to the EU, highlight the challenges 
the EU faces in overcoming extremist ideologies and threat 
vulnerabilities, and outline the pro-active measures the EU 
will take to undermine Al Qaeda’s radicalization and recruit-
ment in Europe. Coreper sought to advance particular goals 
that emphasized their twin norms of achieving more secu-
rity integration alongside the strengthening of the EU legal 
space.  
First, the ambassadors argued that the EU should enact a 
comprehensive response. They agreed that there is a dan-
gerous, distorted version of Islam that must be combated 
with efforts to integrate Muslims into society and empower 
moderate voices. To do this, they emphasized the importance 
of non-state, transnational actors like NGOs, alongside state-
driven solutions. The result was to decrease the responsibil-
ity of member states alone in tackling the problem.  Coreper 
believed that empowering moderate voices and involving 
NGOs would weaken the influence of extremist Islam. 
Second, the ambassadors wanted to elevate the perception 
of threat. They believed that more people were at risk, and 
more citizens could be impacted by terrorist activity than had 
been previously anticipated. Prisons, educational institu-
tions, religious training centers, and places of worship were 
all places were recruitment was occurring. They argued that 
even if a specific country had not been a target, this did not 
mean that they were immune. They called upon member 
states to approach the problem of radicalization and recruit-
ment as a European problem. Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia, 
for example, do not have problems with radicalization yet all 
three ambassadors agreed that they must take a European 
approach and engage in the debate about what should be 
done.
Third, they agreed that any action taken by the EU with 
respect to radicalization and recruitment must be legiti-
mated. To accomplish this, they added to the final draft 
specific mention of protecting fundamental rights, putting 
in place a legal framework, encouraging a political dia-
logue, and involving experts such as academics in shaping 
policies. The idea of protecting fundamental rights, common 
to all citizens of the EU, once again demonstrated the idea 
that through asserting “Europeanness” radicalization and 
recruitment to extremism could be counteracted. As much 
of EU legislation already rests on a strong legal system and 
respect for rights, they argued that the effort to combat ter-
rorism was no exception.
Since the Strategy was made public on 24 November 2005, 
Coreper has revised its policy goals every six months to take 
into account actual progress and their ongoing deliberations. 
The SRR became part of the more general EU Action Plan for 
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Combating Terrorism, a policy for which Coreper also per-
formed the preparatory work. The new initiatives include: 
public diplomacy to explain and legitimate EU actions to the 
international community and to put forward a common EU 
image; information sharing across member-states; setting up 
funding for individual research that would aim to strengthen 
the relationship between civil society and European authori-
ties, and multinational funding to generate policy proposals 
that would require a European approach to combating terror-
ism; and a new approach to extremism that would treat it as 
a danger within all religions, instead of emphasizing Islam 
alone.  
Biannual progress reports show that major initiatives have 
been successfully launched along these lines, including: 
the implementation of a media communication strategy; 
the development of a “common lexicon of terms”; a signed 
agreement among member-states to abide by EU laws 
criminalizing both direct and indirect incitement of terrorist 
activities; multinational meetings to promote interfaith and 
intercultural dialogue, direct involvement of major NGOs, 
and so on.  
In the end, Coreper persuaded member-states to envision 
the EU as a contiguous “homeland” in which policy would 
be legitimated. Despite the fact that the majority of member-
states had not even experienced the problem of radicaliza-
tion, Coreper successfully reframed the issue as European 
thereby significantly advancing internal security integration.
Conclusion
These two examples of knowledge-based networks, as well 
as many others, demonstrate how these expert groups have 
influenced the trajectory of European security policy for 
some time.  In facing the security challenges of today, mem-
ber states should recognize the important role that these 
knowledge-based networks have played thus far. Indeed, the 
expertise-driven processes among these actors are gradually 
contributing to important innovations in European integra-
tion and enhancing its ability to act as one. In searching for a 
way forward in the context of such an intense threat environ-
ment, member states should not give into the temptation to 
“nationalize” their security policies, and to retreat into the 
old, state-driven ways of protecting themselves. This only 
serves to weaken the EU as an actor, and each member state 
individually, sending the message that Europe is fragile and 
divided. In this time of economic recovery, the EU has far 
more potential for success through finding innovative ways 
to pool and share on many levels. 
Because of the work of these knowledge-based networks in 
the security realm, the EU has surpassed NATO in the variety 
of initiatives it can do around the world.  Considering that 
some of the most urgent security challenges are inherently 
transnational – cyber war, terrorism, migration, climate 
change, and trafficking, to name a few – expert networks 
which are themselves transnational are ideally positioned 
to discover mutually preferable solutions that will work for 
Europe as a whole. Through their cohesiveness, these epis-
temic communities can also serve as a fulcrum to involve 
potential partners, such as the US, Norway, and others, in 
achieving these shared security goals together.
